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ABSTRACT:	  Since	  1989,	  NATO	  has	  expanded	  its	  strategic	  concept	  and	  geopolitical	  scope	  to	  the	  detriment	  
of	  an	  efficient	  and	  well-­‐defined	  military	  capability	  in	  Europe.	  The	  Ukrainian	  crisis	  has	  brought	  the	  attention	  
back	  to	  Europe	  and	  to	  NATO’s	  deterrent	  value.	  As	  one	  of	  the	  Alliance’s	  leading	  members,	  Britain	  must	  act	  
as	  a	  catalyst	  to	  ensure	  that	  NATO	  has	  the	  necessary	  military	  strength	  and	  political	  will	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  
new	  security	  challenges.	  	  
	  
	  
In	  his	  recent	  budget,	  Chancellor	  George	  Osborne	  announced	  that	  the	  UK	  will	  meet	  the	  
pledge	   to	   spend	   2	   per	   cent	   of	   gross	   national	   product	   on	   defence	   for	   the	   rest	   of	   this	  
decade.	  Defence	  spending	  will	  grow	  by	  0.5	  per	  cent	  per	  year,	  increasing	  from	  £38	  billion	  
this	  year	  to	  almost	  £48	  billion	  in	  2020.	  Cheers	  from	  Washington	  and	  Brussels	  welcomed	  
the	   announcement.1	  The	   UK	   will	   now	   enter	   a	   small	   club	   of	   five	   NATO	  members	   that	  
meet	   the	  Alliance’s	   target.	  US	  and	  NATO	  officials	  hope	   that	  other	  European	  allies	  will	  
follow	  the	  British	  example	  and	  increase	  their	  defence	  budgets.2	  
A	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   small	   print	   however	   reveals	   a	   less	   encouraging	   picture.	  
Osborne	  himself	  admitted	  that	  to	  meet	  the	  2	  per	  cent	  target,	  the	  UK	  will	  make	  full	  use	  
of	  NATO’s	  broad	  definition	  of	  ‘defence	  spending’.	  The	  UK	  government	  already	  includes	  
the	  cost	  of	  military	  pensions	  and	  overseas	  stabilisation	  missions	   in	   its	  defence	  budget.	  
Now,	   there	   is	   the	   idea	   of	   adding	   some	   of	   the	   costs	   of	   the	   UK’s	   surveillance	   and	  
monitoring	   agencies.	   The	   government	   may	   also	   look	   into	   ways	   to	   redirect	   some	  
resources	   from	  the	  Department	   for	   International	  Development	  to	  pay	   for	  some	  of	   the	  
humanitarian	  work	  carried	  out	  by	   the	  armed	   forces.	  These	  are	  of	   course	   sensible	  and	  
practical	  suggestions	  but	  if	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  UK	  has	  an	  efficient,	  modern	  
and	  capable	  army,	  and	  that	  –	  as	  a	  consequence	  –	  NATO	  does	  too,	  then	  something	  has	  
been	  lost	  on	  the	  way.	  
The	  timing	  of	  the	  decision	  is	  important.	  After	  an	  initial	  phase	  in	  which	  the	  defence	  
budget	   seemed	   to	   dominate	   the	   electoral	   campaign	   earlier	   this	   year,	   there	  was	   little	  
mention	  of	  the	  issue	  during	  the	  actual	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  election	  and	  it	  did	  not	  figure	  in	  the	  
Conservative	  manifesto.	  The	  new	  government	  announced	  the	  commitment	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  
could	  after	   the	  election	  and	   in	  good	   time	   to	   shape	   the	   forthcoming	  Strategic	  Defence	  
and	  Security	  Review	   (SDSR),	  due	   later	   this	  year.	  This	   is	   therefore	  a	  crucially	   important	  
time	  to	  think	  about	  what	  role	  the	  UK	  hopes	  to	  play	  in	  the	  Alliance,	  in	  Europe	  and	  in	  the	  
world.	  	  
The	  key	  issue	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  pledge	  to	  meet	  the	  2	  per	  cent	  figure	  but	  to	  make	  
sure	   that	   NATO	   remains	   an	   effective	   political	   and	  military	   alliance	   able	   to	   deter	   any	  
aggression,	  and	  able	  to	  take	  up	  a	  proactive	  role	  on	  the	  world	  stage.	  There	  is	  already	  a	  
rather	   intense	   debate	   around	   the	   usefulness	   of	   the	   2	   per	   cent	   target.	   Critics	   have	  
pointed	  out	  that	  it	  measures	  input	  not	  output,	  and	  that	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  give	  an	  
indication	  of	  military	  capability,	  deployability	  and	  sustainability	  levels.	  Most	  crucially,	  it	  
says	  nothing	  about	   the	  countries’	   resolve	   to	  deploy	   their	   forces	  on	   the	  ground	  and	  to	  
take	  risks.	  Yet,	  the	  2	  per	  cent	  target	  remains	  politically	  significant	  as	  it	  is	  used	  –	  mostly	  
by	  the	  US	  –	  to	  divide	  the	  European	  members	  between	  ‘partners’	  and	  ‘free-­‐riders’.3	  If	  the	  
UK	  is	  to	  play	  an	  active	  political	  role	  in	  the	  Alliance	  and	  be	  included	  among	  the	  ‘partners’,	  
it	   is	   essential	   that	   London	   shows	   itself	   willing	   to	   reverse	   the	   decrease	   in	   military	  
spending	   and	   pledge	   to	   aim	   to	   meet	   the	   target.	   If,	   however,	   the	   ultimate	   aim	   is	   to	  
modernise	  and	  make	  UK	  defence	  more	  effective,	  efficient	  and	  able	  to	  take	  up	  a	  leading	  
role	  in	  the	  alliance,	  then	  jiggling	  with	  the	  budget	  is	  not	  the	  answer	  and	  the	  target	  itself	  is	  
meaningless.	   The	   UK	   must	   contribute	   proactively	   to	   the	   Alliance’s	   defensive	   and	  
strategic	   roles	   as	   well	   as	   ensure	   that	   NATO’s	   internal	   political	   cohesion	   is	   solid	   and	  
resilient.	   In	  order	   to	  do	   so,	   the	  UK	  needs	   first	   to	   think	  about	   its	  place	   in	   Europe	  and,	  
more	  broadly,	  about	   its	  own	  geopolitical	  role,	   its	  priorities	  and	  its	  foreign-­‐policy	  goals.	  
London	   should	   assess	   how	   such	   goals	   translate	   in	   terms	   of	   action	   and	   participation	  
within	  the	  NATO	  framework.	  This	  article	  puts	  forward	  a	  few	  suggestions.	  	  
	  
NATO	  Today	  
The	  Ukrainian	  crisis	  has	  brought	  the	  attention	  back	  to	  the	  European	  theatre	  and	  military	  
deterrence.	  The	  Alliance	  has	  met	  its	  commitments	  under	  Article	  4	  and	  has	  reassured	  its	  
members	   on	   the	   eastern	   flank	  which	   felt	   threatened	   by	   Russia.	   In	   April	   2014,	   the	  US	  
sent	   twelve	   F-­‐16	   fighters	   to	   Poland	   and	   ten	   F-­‐15s	   to	   the	  Baltic	   States	   for	   air-­‐patrols.4	  
Four	  British	  Typhoons	  joined	  them	  a	  year	  later.5	  NATO	  has	  also	  dispatched	  Boeing	  E-­‐3As	  
to	  monitor	   Eastern	   European	  airspace.	  Moreover,	   in	   September,	   the	   first	   of	   six	  NATO	  
Force	   Integration	   Units	   were	   inaugurated.	   These	   are	   designed	   to	   enable	   the	   fast	  
deployment	  of	  the	  new	  NATO	  Response	  Force	  (NRF)	   in	  times	  of	  crisis.6	  In	  October	  and	  
November	  2015,	   the	   largest	  NATO	  military	   exercise	   in	   the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	   era	   (Trident	  
Juncture,	  TJ15)	   is	  being	  hosted	  primarily	  by	   Italy,	  Portugal	  and	  Spain.	  TJ15	  will	   involve	  
36,000	  personnel	   from	   thirty	  Allied	   and	  Partner	  Nations.7	  In	   addition,	  NATO	  has	   been	  
liaising	  closely	  with	  the	  governments	  of	  Sweden	  and	  Finland.	  On	  10	  September,	  Russian	  
concerns	  prompted	  the	  first-­‐ever	  UN-­‐Nordic	  Deputy	  Defence	  Ministers	  meeting.8	  	  
The	   problem	   is	   Article	   5.	   Would	   NATO	   intervene	   if	   Russia	   carried	   out	   an	  
asymmetric	  attack,	  or	  non-­‐linear	  warfare	  that	  fell	  below	  the	  official	  definition	  of	  ‘armed	  
attack’	  specified	  by	  the	  Treaty?	  Once	  again,	  political	  cohesion	  is	  essential	  and,	  if	  needed,	  
NATO	  must	  act	  quickly	  as	  one,	  fully	  committed	  alliance.	  If	  NATO	  does	  not	  achieve	  such	  
level	   of	   political	   cohesion	   not	   only	   would	   it	   not	   be	   able	   to	   respond	   quickly	   and	  
effectively	  to	  a	  possible	  attack	  but	  its	  very	  deterrent	  value	  would	  be	  nullified.	  	  
In	  this	  context,	  the	  question	  of	  political	  leadership	  is	  central.	  Even	  in	  the	  restricted	  
scenario	   of	   the	   Ukrainian	   crisis,	   NATO	   members	   have	   not	   reached	   a	   workable	  
agreement	   regarding	   what	   lines	   the	   diplomatic	   exchange	   with	   Russia	   should	   follow.	  
Should	  they,	  for	  example,	  uphold	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  1997	  NATO-­‐Russia	  Founding	  Act	  
whereby	   the	   Alliance	   has	   ‘no	   intention,	   no	   plan	   and	   no	   reason’	   to	   place	   significant	  
military	   assets	   in	   ex-­‐Warsaw	   Pact	   countries?	   Or	   should	   they	   take	   a	   strong	   stand	   on	  
Russia’s	   violation	   of	   international	   law	   and	   consider	   stationing	   troops	   and	   nuclear	  
weapons	   in	   the	   territory	   of	   new	  members?	   Should	   the	   Alliance	   talk	   as	   one	   actor	   or	  
should	   leading	   members	   –	   like	   Germany	   –	   take	   the	   lead?	   These	   points	   add	   to	   the	  
already	  vitriolic	  discussion	  on	  whether	  NATO	  should	  expand	   further	  eastwards	  and	  on	  
the	   alleged	   betrayal	   of	   Russia’s	   trust	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades.9	  Political	   consensus	  
within	  the	  Alliance	  is	  notably	  fragmented.	  Germany	  and	  Italy	  are	  keen	  to	  give	  priority	  to	  
diplomatic	  negotiations	  while	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	  support	  the	  Baltic	  States’	  and	  Poland’s	  
calls	  for	  a	  firmer	  military	  stand.	  Of	  course,	  the	  Ukrainian	  crisis	  is	  only	  one	  of	  the	  security	  
threats	  NATO	  and	   its	  members	   face	   today.	  Daesh	   (also	   known	  as	   the	   Islamic	   State	  of	  
Iraq	  and	  Syria,	  ISIS)	  now	  controls	  large	  portions	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Syria.	  It	  controls	  an	  area	  that	  
is	   larger	  than	  the	  UK.	  Similarly,	  Boko	  Haram	  now	  controls	  a	  more	  than	  half	  of	  Nigeria.	  
South	  Sudan	  is	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  civil	  war	  and	  instability	  persists	  in	  Darfur,	  Afghanistan,	  
Pakistan	  and	  Somalia.	  Piracy	  still	  plagues	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Aden	  and	  millions	  of	  refugees	  are	  
knocking	   of	   Europe’s	   door.	   One	   could	   argue	   that	   these	   threats	   are	   not	   necessarily	  
NATO’s	  concern	  but	  they	  do	  challenge	  the	  security	  and	  stability	  of	  Europe,	  both	  directly	  
–	   as	   the	   refugee	   crisis	   demonstrates	   –	   and	   indirectly	   –	   by	   fostering	   anti-­‐Western	  
terrorist	  groups	  and	  waging	  local	  wars	  that	  affect	  the	  security	  and	  stability	  of	  countries	  
closely	  linked	  to	  some	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Alliance’s	  members.	  	  
These	  issues	  make	  the	  discussion	  of	  what	  the	  Alliance	  is	  for	  all	  the	  more	  urgent.	  It	  
cannot	  do	  everything	  everywhere	  while	  hoping	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  and	  coherent	  voice	  on	  
the	  world	  stage.	  
	  
The	  UK	  and	  NATO:	  A	  Need	  for	  Leadership	  
The	  UK	  cannot	  afford	   to	   ignore	   the	  new	  security	  challenges	  and	   it	   cannot	   retreat	   into	  
isolation.	  London	  has	  traditionally	  offered	  leadership	  both	  in	  international	  organisations	  
and	  by	  taking	  upon	  itself	  to	  intervene	  in	  crisis	  situations,	  like	  in	  Sierra	  Leone.	  Because	  of	  
its	  history	  and	  heritage,	  the	  UK	  is	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  a	  very	  important	  network	  of	  alliances,	  
has	   unique	   insight	   into	   some	   of	   the	   key	   problems	   and	   geographical	   areas	  mentioned	  
above,	  and	  has	  the	  military	  and	  diplomatic	  expertise	  that	   is	  essential	  to	  engage	  with	  a	  
variety	  of	  actors,	  countries	  and	  concerns.	  Yet,	   it	  seems	  that	  over	  the	  past	  decade,	   the	  
UK	  has	  lost	  the	  determination	  to	  act	  as	  a	  leader	  in	  the	  European	  arena.	  	  
Like	   many	   other	   European	   states,	   the	   UK	   assumed	   that	   in	   the	   post-­‐Cold	   War	  
environment,	   traditional	   military	   capabilities	   were	   no	   longer	   needed	   and	   that	   new,	  
smaller,	  specialised	  tasks	  had	  to	  be	  developed.	  Political	  and	  economic	  stabilisation	  and	  
crisis-­‐management	  operations	  became	   the	  new	  priorities.	   The	  1998	   Strategic	  Defence	  
Review	  (SDR)10	  and	  the	  2010	  SDSR	  oversaw	  a	  progressive	  reduction	  and	  consolidation	  of	  
British	   armed	   forces.11	  In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis	   and	   cuts	   in	   spending,	   the	  
2010	  SDSR	  was	  particularly	  firm	  in	  reducing	  the	  £38	  billion	  overspend	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Defence’s	   procurement	   budget. 12 	  Both	   documents	   were	   ‘Treasury-­‐led’	   and	   aimed	  
primarily	  at	  reducing	  expenditure	  by	  consolidating	  resources.13	  In	  the	  same	  period,	  the	  
UK	  took	  part	  in	  several	  peacekeeping,	  humanitarian	  and	  disaster-­‐relief	  operations	  under	  
the	   auspices	   of	   the	  UN	   and	  NATO.14	  At	   the	   time	   it	  was	   argued	   that	   despite	   the	   cuts,	  
‘planned	   levels	   of	   defence	   spending	   should	   be	   enough	   for	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   to	  
maintain	  its	  position	  as	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  top	  military	  powers,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  one	  of	  
NATO-­‐Europe’s	  top	  military	  powers’.15	  	  Yet,	  it	  was	  clear	  that,	  in	  the	  long-­‐term,	  the	  UK’s	  
status	   as	   a	   major	   power	   was	   set	   to	   be	   eroded	   and	   experts	   started	   to	   talk	   about	  
‘overstretch’	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  capability	  and	  of	  tasks	  –	  and	  about	  ‘personnel	  retention’	  
issues.	   The	  military’s	   ability	   to	   fulfil	   the	  UK’s	   overseas	   commitments	   in	   the	   long-­‐term	  
was	  brought	  into	  question.16	  
According	  to	  the	  recent	  Parliamentary	  Defence	  Committee	  report,	  the	  2010	  SDSR	  
was	  unable	  to	  provide	  an	  insight	  into	  emerging	  security	  threats	  and	  international	  crises,	  
and	  was	   an	   insufficient	   basis	   to	   build	   adequate	  military	   capabilities.17	  In	   other	  words,	  
the	  cuts	  did	  not	  allow	  for	  a	  geopolitical	  scenario	  involving	  state-­‐on-­‐state	  war	  in	  Europe	  
or	  for	  complex	  responses	  to	  non-­‐linear	  warfare.	  The	  issue	  is	  that	  while	  there	  have	  been	  
spending	   cuts	   and	   rationalisation	   of	   resources,	   there	   has	   not	   been	   a	   re-­‐think	   of	   the	  
overall	  strategic	   focus	  and	  global	  goals	  underpinning	  UK	  defence	  and	  security	  policies.	  
Instead,	  the	  UK	  continues	  to	  aim	  to	  maintain	  the	  full	  military	  capability	  of	  an	  advanced	  
power	  (three	  full	  services,	  employing	  everything	  from	  tanks	  to	  the	  most	  modern	  fighter	  
jets	  as	  well	  as	  nuclear	  weapons).	  The	  focus	   is	  also	  not	  restricted	  to	  a	  particular	  region	  
and	  the	  ambition	  is	  to	  be	  able	  to	  engage	  globally.	  In	  this	  context,	  Osborne’s	  statements	  
should	  not	  cause	  excessive	  enthusiasm:	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  increased	  resources	  will	  be	  used	  to	  
modernise	  and	  maintain	  current	  defence	  levels.	  	  
Yet,	   even	   if	   the	   actual	   impact	   of	   the	   new	   defence	   budget	   may	   be	   less	   than	   it	  
suggests,	  the	  commitment	  to	  meet	  the	  2	  per	  cent	  target	  is	  an	  important	  political	  sign.	  It	  
flags	  the	  UK’s	  determination	  to	  be	  a	  reliable	  partner	  and	  to	  play	  a	  proactive	  role	  within	  
the	   Alliance.	   It	   also	   reassures	   Washington	   that	   London	   remains	   its	   most	   important	  
European	   partner.	   By	  meeting	   the	   target,	   the	   UK	   is	   now	   in	   a	   position	   to	   push	   other	  
European	   allies	   to	   reverse	   the	   decrease	   in	   their	   defence	   spending	   and	   to	   lead	   the	  
political	  debate	  about	  Europe’s	  security	  strategy	  and	  geopolitical	  role.	  	  
It	  is	  not	  all	  doom	  and	  gloom.	  The	  UK	  remains	  an	  important	  member	  of	  NATO	  and	  
it	   has	   indeed	   helped	   shape	   the	   alliance	   agenda	   in	   recent	   months.	   For	   example,	   the	  
government	   hosted	   the	  Wales	   Summit	   in	   September	   2014	   and	   it	  was	   instrumental	   in	  
mediating	   between	   the	   various	   partners	   to	   achieve	   political	   consensus	   behind	   the	  
strengthening	  of	  the	  Rapid	  Reaction	  Force.	  	  The	  UK	  was	  also	  one	  of	  the	  first	  members	  to	  
step	  forward	  and	  to	  provide	  a	  battle	  group	  and	  brigade	  headquarters	  to	  the	  new	  Very	  
High	  Readiness	  Joint	  Task	  Force.	  Clearly,	  the	  UK	  is	  an	  active	  member.	  But	  is	  it	  a	  leader?	  
In	   NATO,	   the	   UK’s	  most	   powerful	   ally	   remains	   the	   US.	   Yet,	   London	  must	  move	  
away	  from	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  war	  assumption	  that	  the	  US	  would	  be	  able	  –	  and	  willing	  –	  to	  
compensate	  at	   least	  for	  some	  UK	  capability	  gaps	  given	  that	  London	  generally	  operates	  
in	   coalition	   with	   its	   most	   powerful	   ally.	   This	   cannot	   be	   taken	   for	   granted	   and	   over-­‐
reliance	  on	  this	  partnership	  may	  reduce	  the	  UK’s	  room	  for	  manoeuvre.	  More	  than	  once,	  
the	  US	  has	  expressed	  concerns	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  contributes	  for	  70	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  
Alliance’s	   budget	   and	   US	   Defence	   Secretary	   Robert	   Gates	   famously	   warned	   the	  
Europeans	  not	  to	  they	  rely	  on	  the	  US	  support	  and	  to	  invest	  more	  in	  defence.18	  This	  also	  
applies	  to	  the	  UK.	  Prior	  to	  Osborne’s	  announcement,	  the	  US	  expressed	  openly	  concern	  
that	   cuts	   in	   the	   UK	   defence	   budget	   would	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   UK–US	   co-­‐operation.	  
President	  Barack	  Obama	  himself	  called	  Prime	  Minister	  David	  Cameron	  in	  February	  2015	  
to	   ask	   for	   the	   commitment	   to	   the	   2	   per	   cent	   figure	   and	   to	   have	   the	  UK	   play	   a	  more	  
effective	  role	  in	  the	  Alliance.19	  Thus,	  while	  there	  is	  no	  sign	  that	  the	  UK–US	  partnership	  is	  
in	  danger,	  London	  should	  not	  take	  this	  for	  granted	  and	  it	  should	  make	  sure	  that	  it	  has	  a	  
strong	   say	   in	   the	   Alliance.	   The	   UK	   needs	   to	   build	   once	   again	   on	   its	   position	   as	   a	  
‘European’	   as	  well	   as	   an	   ‘Anglo-­‐Saxon’	  member	   of	   the	   Alliance	   so	   as	   to	   facilitate	   the	  
dialogue	  between	   the	   two	   sides	   of	   the	  Atlantic	   about	   different	   priorities	   and	   security	  
concerns.	  It	  is	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  to	  translate	  different	  strategic	  concerns	  and	  security	  
priorities	  and	  to	  foster	  dialogue	  between	  Washington	  and	  the	  European	  capitals.	  This	  is	  
what	  London	  did	  very	  well	   in	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	   it	  should	  aim	  to	  do	  this	  now.	   It	  would	  
make	  the	  Alliance,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  partnership	  between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK	  stronger.	  	  
In	   Europe,	   the	   UK’s	   strongest	   partner	   is	   France.	   The	   most	   recent	   phase	   of	   co-­‐
operation	  with	  the	  French	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  Lancaster	  House	  Treaties	  of	  2010,	  which	  set	  
up	  the	  Combined	  Joint	  Expeditionary	  Force.	  The	  best	  example	  of	  this	  collaboration	  was	  
in	   Libya	   in	   2011.	   The	   military	   operation	   at	   the	   time	   was	   efficient	   and	   effective.	  
Unfortunately,	  there	  was	  no	  effort	  –	  or	  at	   least	  no	  success	  –	  in	  stabilising	  the	  country,	  
which	  precipitated	  a	  new	  crisis.	   London	  should	  build	  on	   this	   co-­‐operation.	  The	  French	  
are	  keen	  and	  have	  expressed	  disappointment	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  enthusiasm	  of	  their	  partners.	  
France’s	  operation	  in	  Mali	  (Operation	  Barkhane)	  was	  a	  good	  example	  of	  how	  long-­‐term	  
country	   knowledge	   and	   a	  well-­‐planned	  military	   engagement	   could	   stop	   state	   collapse	  
and	   prevent	   a	   terrorist-­‐affiliate	   takeover.	   This	   is	   something	   the	  many	   NATO	   partners	  
should	  consider	  emulating.	  
NATO	   find	   itself	   at	   a	   crossroads	   in	   which	   it	   must	   decide	   what	   it	   wants	   to	   be.	  
Emerging	   security	   challenges	  across	   the	  world	  and	  different	   threat	  perceptions	  within	  
the	  Alliance,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  variety	  of	  national	  interests,	  mean	  that	  now,	  more	  than	  ever,	  
NATO	  must	  decide	  its	  geopolitical	  scope	  and	  its	  priorities	  or	  it	  will	  not	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  
respond	   to	   effectively	   to	   threats	   to	   national	   soverignity	   and	   integrity	   as	  well	   as	   non-­‐
linear	  warfare	  attacks	  in	  Europe.	  The	  crisis	  in	  Ukraine	  shows	  this	  well.	  	  
The	   UK	   is	   at	   a	   crossroads	   too.	   London	   should	   lead	   the	   debate	   as	   it	   is	   uniquely	  
placed	  to	  bring	  together	  the	  European	  allies	  and	  the	  US.	  It	  is	  also	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  long-­‐
term	  networks	  –	   including,	  but	  not	   limited	   to,	   the	  Commonwealth	  –	   that	   stretch	  well	  
beyond	  the	  NATO	  area	  and	  Europe.	  This	  allows	  the	  country	  to	  have	  a	  broader	  and	  more	  
sophisticated	   insight	   into	   emerging	   security	   challenges.	   Its	   long-­‐term	   engagements	  
mean	  that	  the	  UK	  also	  has	  long-­‐standing	  expertise	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  counter-­‐terrorism	  and	  
humanitarian	  intervention.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  uniquely	  placed	  to	  offer	  leadership	  within	  NATO	  
at	  a	  time	  when	  pragmatism,	  expertise	  and	  clear	  vision	  are	  badly	  needed.	  Yet	  to	  do	  that,	  
the	   UK	   itself	   must	   decide	   what	   it	   wants	   to	   be	   and	   what	   it	   wants	   to	   achieve.	   It	   is	  
ultimately,	   as	   always,	   a	   question	   of	   political	   leadership	   and	   assessment	   and	   it	   is	  
essential	   that	   the	  UK	   resist	   the	   temptation	   to	   retreat	   into	   isolation	   or	   to	   proceed	   via	  
bilateral	  agreements	  and	  special	  relationships.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  of	  its	  partners	  that	  the	  country	  takes	  full	  advantage	  of	  
its	  unique	  position,	  alliances	  and	  expertise.	  This	  is	  the	  time	  to	  engage	  broadly	  and	  to	  put	  
to	   good	   use	   the	   diplomatic	   channels	   offered	   by	   the	   Alliance.	   Political	   and	   diplomatic	  
exchange	   among	   its	   members	   is	   what	   NATO	   does	   best	   and	   London	   should	   use	   it	   to	  
stimulate	   the	  debate	   about	   the	   security	   and	  peace	  of	   Europe	   and	  of	   its	   neighbouring	  
areas.	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